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1TO TRUST, OR NOT TO TRUST:
COGNITIVE REFLECTION IN TRUST GAMES1
Abstract: We present results from two studies that show a positive
relation between cognitive reflection and trusting behavior, but no
significant relation with trustworthy behavior. Our finding holds
regardless of individual distributional social preferences and risk
aversion. Our results add to a growing body of literature that
illustrates the role of cognitive ability in helping explain outcomes
in economic experiments.
INTRODUCTION
Trust is essential for the consummation of exchange and subsequent realization of gains
(Smith, 1759). Arrow (1972) argued that trust is indispensable for the proper functioning of any
economic system: “Virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust…
It can be plausibly argued that much of the economic backwardness in the world can be
explained by the lack of mutual confidence” (p. 357). Relatedly, trust has been shown to impact
economic variables such as growth and financial development (Algan and Cahuc, 2010) as well
as entrepreneurship and trade (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004, 2006). In sum, trust is seen
as the lubricant that facilitates exchange in society so its relevance cannot be overstated.
In this paper, we propose a microeconomic analysis of the determinants of trust. We build
on the experimental economics literature that has developed (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe, 1995)
and extensively studied (see meta-analysis by Johnson and Mislin, 2011) incentivized behavioral
measures of trust and trustworthiness. Interestingly, there is evidence of a relation between the
behavioral measure of trust developed in the lab and macroeconomic variables. For example,
1 The authors acknowledge financial support from the International Foundation for Research in Experimental
Economics, the Argyros School of Business and Economics at Chapman University, the Spanish Ministry of
Education [Grant 2012/00103/001], Spanish Plan Nacional I+D MCI [ECO2013-44879-R], 2014-17, and Proyectos
de Excelencia de la Junta Andalucía [P12.SEJ.1436], 2014-18.
2Johnson and Mislin (2011) found a positive correlation between GDP in a given country and the
experimental measure of trust of a sample of its population.
Although a number of personal characteristics ranging from personality traits to
education may affect trusting behavior, we focus on the role of cognitive ability. This is
motivated by the fact that previous research has reported preliminary evidence of a positive
correlation between intelligence and generalized trust (i.e. trust in other members of the society)
(Sturgis, Read and Allum, 2010; Hooghe, Marien and de Vroome, 2012; Carl and Billarri, 2014).
Generalized trust is a self-reported measure of trust, which is assessed by non-incentivized
survey questions such as “How often do you trust others?” Recently, Carl and Billari (2014) have
shown that there exists a positive correlation between generalized trust and measures of
intelligence in a large, nationally representative sample of U.S. adults. Their measures of
intelligence were both objective and subjective: subjects were evaluated on the basis of exactly
how they responded to a verbal test, or the perception of an interviewer regarding how well they
understood the questions asked. We extend this research by studying a behavioral measure of
trust that was elicited in a controlled and incentivized environment. In addition, we consider
whether a validated and widely used measure of cognitive ability: the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT) can explain trust or trustworthiness behavior in our particular experiment.
Our work also contributes to the growing body of research on the relation between
cognitive abilities and economic behavior in the experimental economics literature. A large
number of experimental studies have used the CRT (Frederick, 2005) both because of its short
duration and its unprecedented success in predicting economic decisions (e.g. Oechssler, Roider,
and Schmitz, 2009). For example, student performance in the CRT has been shown to correlate
positively with earnings in experimental asset markets (Corgnet, Hernán-González, Kujal and
Porter, 2015) and other individual tasks and games involving risk and time preferences
(Frederick, 2005; Oechssler, Roider, and Schmitz, 2009; Brañas-Garza, García-Muñoz, and
Hernán-González, 2012). The CRT has also been shown to be positively correlated with general
measures of intelligence such as the SAT (Frederick, 2005).
The CRT may be an especially relevant measure of cognitive ability for the study of
strategic economic decisions (e.g. trust) because it simultaneously captures the ability to engage
in reflective processes and execute computational tasks measured in standard intelligence tests
3(e.g. SAT or Raven matrices; Toplak, West and Stanovich, 2011). In the CRT, respondents are
given three questions to which there is an intuitive (automatic) yet incorrect answer. However,
with a little deliberation (or cognitive reflection) subjects can override the intuitive response and
figure out the correct answer.
In this paper we employ two studies to look at the relation between cognitive reflection
and trust. In the first part we examine data from a trust study that uses the standard CRT
measure. In the second, we use an augmented version of the CRT (Toplak, West and Stanovich,
2014) as well as elicit subjects’ distributional social preferences à la Bartling et al. (2009) and
risk attitudes (Holt and Laury, 2002). We find a positive relation between scores on both CRT
tests and trust, but not a significant relation with trustworthiness. Our results are robust to
whether participants play only one role (Study 1) or both (Study 2) and also whether the game is
implemented as a direct-response (Study 1) or strategy method (Study 2). Finally, these results
hold when controlling for social preferences and risk aversion (Study 2).
Study 1: A first look at the relation between CRT, Trust and Trustworthiness
Methods
As part of a project studying communication and trust, we recruited 80 subjects (52.50% female)
to participate in a baseline treatment. We conducted a total of 6 independent sessions with either
12 or 14 subjects in each session. Subjects were recruited from a database of more than 2,000
students attending a major U.S. university. A subset of the whole database received invitations at
random for participating in the current study. The experiment lasted for one hour and subjects
earned an average of $14.25 including a $7 show-up fee.
Measurement of trust. In this study, we use the game of trust described in Charness and
Dufwenberg (2006; 2010). In the first stage of the game, player A decides whether to play In or
Out. If player A chooses Out then the game is over and each player earns $5. If player A chooses
In then player B has to select either Don’t or Roll. If player B chooses Don’t then player B gets
$14 whereas player A gets nothing. If player B chooses Roll, then the roll of a six-sided die
decides whether the final outcome of the game is a success or a failure. If it is a success (which
occurs with probability 5/6) player A gets $12 and player B gets $10, and if it is a failure player
A gets nothing while player B gets $10. The payoffs of the game are described in Figure 1. This
4game can be seen as a game of trust à la Berg et al. (1995) where player A is the trustor and
player B is the trustee. The decision for player A to trust thus corresponds to choosing In and the
decision for player B to be trustworthy corresponds to choosing Roll. This game slightly differs
from the standard trust game because of the role of chance. As a result, if player A gets zero
payoff in this game (s)he does not know whether this is due to player B choosing Don’t roll the
die or if it is due to bad luck in the Roll.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly assigned to one of two separate rooms. All subjects
in each room were assigned the same role (e.g. Player A) and were informed that they would be
matched with a player in another room playing a different role (e.g. Player B). In contrast to
Charness and Dufwenberg (2006; 2010), the game was not played using a strategy-method
procedure. Instead, subjects in the role of player B were asked to Roll or Don’t roll only if player
A, who they had been matched with, had chosen In.
Figure 1- The Charness-Dufwenberg (2006; 2010) Trust Game
5Measurement of cognitive reflection. In addition to playing the trust game, we asked subjects
to complete the CRT. We list the CRT questions below:
(1) A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the ball. How much does
the ball cost? ____ cents [Correct answer: 5 cents; intuitive answer: 10 cents]
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to
make 100 widgets? ____ minutes [Correct answer: 5 minutes; intuitive answer: 100 minutes]
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days
for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the
lake? ____ days [Correct answer: 47 days; intuitive answer: 24 days]
Our measure of cognitive reflection is given by the total number of correct answers (mean
±SEM = 1.52±0.18 for females, 1.95±0.19 for males; Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p = 0.102).
As is standard practice, the cognitive reflection test was not incentivized (Frederick, 2005;
Brañas et al. 2015).
Results
The distribution of CRT scores along with the relative frequency of trust (In) and trustworthy
choices (Roll) is displayed in Table 1.
TABLE 1: Frequency of Trust and Trustworthiness decision by CRT scores
CRT
Trust
(In) [n=40]
Trustworthiness
(Roll) [n=27]+
0 57% [n=7] 25% [n=8]
1 50% [n=12] 40% [n=5]
2 67% [n=6] 40% [n=5]
3 87% [n=15] 55% [n=9]
+Since 67% (27 out of 40) of A players chose In, only 27 B players made a decision.
In Table 2 we report the regression analysis of the Trust decision (coded as a dummy that
takes value 1 if Player A chose In and 0 otherwise) on CRT scores and gender using a probit
6regression with robust standard errors (regressions [1] and [2]). We obtain a positive and
significant relation between CRT scores and trust. This relation holds, whether we control for
gender (p-value=0.061, column [2]) or not (p-value=0.054, column [1]). Although
trustworthiness also increases with CRT scores (Table 1), the same analysis for the
Trustworthiness decision (coded as a dummy that takes value 1 if Player B chose Roll and value
0 otherwise) does not result in a significant CRT coefficient (p-value=0.215 and p-value=0.214
in columns [3] and [4]).
TABLE 2. Probit regression for Trust and Trustworthiness
Trust Trustworthiness
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Intercept -0.13
(0.37)
-0.03
(0.47)
-0.64
(0.41)
-0.51
(0.51)
CRT 0.36*
(0.19)
0.35*
(0.19)
0.25
(0.20)
0.26
(0.21)
Female -0.13
(0.43)
-0.22
(0.51)
No. of observations
Pseudo-R²
Wald-χ²
n = 40
0.07
3.70*
n = 40
0.08
3.68
n = 27
0.04
1.57
n = 27
0.05
1.75
Female is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if subject is female and zero otherwise.
Estimation output using robust standard errors (in parentheses).
*p-value<.10, **p-value<.05, and ***p-value<.01
Given the limited number of observations in this first study, we take this finding as only
suggestive of an effect of cognitive ability on trust. The role of chance in the outcome of player
B’s Roll decision may also be influencing the results. We thus designed a second study where we
recruited a larger sample of subjects and for which we implemented a “standard” trust game
following Berg et al. (1995). We also use Study 2 to collect data on distributional social
preferences in order to evaluate whether the CRT effect is driven by its possible relation with
social preferences.
Recent research has investigated the relation between social preferences and intelligence
(Brandstater and Guth, 2002; Ben-Ner, Kong, and Putterman, 2004; Millet and Dewitte, 2006;
Chen, Chiu, Smith and Yamada, 2013). For example, Chen et al. (2013) find a positive relation
between subjects’ score in the Math section of the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) and ‘giving’
in a standard dictator game, but a negative relation between their Grade Point Average (GPA)
and ‘giving’. Closer to our study, distributional social preferences have been recently found to
7correlate with CRT scores (Corgnet, Espin and Hernan-Gonzalez, 2015; Cueva et al., in press;
Ponti and Rodríguez-Lara, 2015). Thus, controlling for subjects’ preferences over simple payoff
distributions provides an interesting robustness check.
Another possible confounding factor in the relation between trust and CRT is related to
people’s risk attitudes. Frederick (2005) found that subjects with higher CRT scores were less
likely to be risk averse. The trust game, which can be framed as an investment game, involves
substantial investment risks related to the uncertainty associated with the behavior of the trustee.
The willingness to trust could thus be positively related to CRT scores due to a higher
willingness of more reflective individuals to engage in a risky investment. Even though prior
evidence regarding the relation between trusting and risky decisions is mixed (Eckel and Wilson,
2004; Fehr, 2009; Houser et al., 2010; Karlan, 2005; Kosfeld et al., 2005), we collected
individual risk attitudes measures (à la Holt and Laury, 2002) to be used as controls in our
regression analyses.
Study 2: A further inquiry into the relation between CRT, Trust and Trustworthiness
Methods
We recruited 100 subjects (47% female) to participate in the study. We conducted a total of 8
independent sessions with either 12 or 14 subjects in each session. Subjects were recruited from
the same database of more than 2,000 students used in Study 1. A subset of the whole database
received invitations at random for participating in the current study with the restriction that they
had not participated in Study 1. In addition to the trust game, subjects were also asked to
complete an extended CRT, a social preferences test and a risk elicitation task. These data were
collected in the context of a larger research program on economic and social preferences,
cognitive abilities and creativity.
Measurement of trust. We consider a variation of the trust game described in Study 1. First,
chance played no role. Second, the game was implemented using the strategy method so that
each of the 100 subjects played both the role of trustor and trustee (see for example Eckel and
Wilson, 2004 and Casari and Cason, 2009). The strategy method allows us to increase the sample
size.
8Both the trustor and the trustee were endowed with 100¢. In the role of the trustor,
subjects had to decide whether to send their entire 100¢ endowment to the trustee or to keep it.
As trustees, subjects had to decide how to split the amount received from the trustor. The amount
sent by the trustor (100¢) was tripled (to 300¢) by the experimenter (as in Berg et al., 1995). The
different allocations available to the trustee were as follows: {300¢,0¢}; {250¢,50¢};
{200¢,100¢}; {150¢,150¢}; {100¢,200¢}; {50¢,250¢} and {0¢,300¢}. Each subject was
randomly assigned to one role and matched with a single partner assigned to the other role to
compute payments.
Measurement of cognitive reflection. We extended the CRT described in Study 1 (Frederick,
2005) by adding four questions recently developed by Toplak, West and Stanovich (2014) all of
which have been validated as a measure of cognitive reflection ( = 0.72). The additional CRT
questions are as follows:
(4) If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 12
days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together? _____ days [correct
answer: 4 days; intuitive answer: 9]
(5) Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many
students are in the class? ______ students [correct answer: 29 students; intuitive answer: 30]
(6) A man buys a pig for $60, sells it for $70, buys it back for $80, and sells it finally for $90.
How much has he made? _____ dollars [correct answer: $20; intuitive answer: $10]
(7) Simon decided to invest $8,000 in the stock market one day early in 2008. Six months after
he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for Simon,
from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, Simon has:
a. broken even in the stock market, b. is ahead of where he began, c. has lost money [correct
answer: c, because the value at this point is $7,000; intuitive response: b].
Again, this test was not incentivized and males obtained a higher score (mean =
4.26±0.29) than females (mean = 3.06±0.29; Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test, p = 0.005).
Measurement of social preferences. We elicited distributional (also referred to as ‘outcome-
based’, see Fehr and Schmidt, 2006) social preferences by asking participants to make four
choices (Bartling et al., 2009). Each choice was between two possible allocations of money for
9that person and another anonymous participant with whom they were randomly matched (see
Table 3). In each choice Option A always provided an even distribution of money ($2 to the self
and the other participant), while Option B provided one of four uneven payoffs: ($2, $1), ($3,
$1), ($2, $4), and ($3, $5) in Choices 1, 2, 3 and 4, respectively. In Bartling et al. (2009), the four
choices are labeled as the ‘prosociality’, ‘costly prosociality’, ‘envy’ and ‘costly envy’ games,
respectively (see the last column of Table 3). In the ‘prosociality’ game, participants had to
decide whether to increase the payoff of a worse-off counterpart at no personal cost. In contrast,
increasing the counterpart’s payoff was costly for the decision maker in the ‘costly prosociality’
game. In the ‘envy’ game, participants could reduce the payoff of a better-off counterpart at no
personal cost, whereas it was costly in the ‘costly envy’ game. Following Bartling et al. (2009),
participants who chose the egalitarian allocation (Option A) in both the ‘prosociality’ and the
‘costly prosociality’ games are categorized as ‘aheadness averse’ (27% in our sample), whereas
those who chose the egalitarian allocation in both the ‘envy’ and the ‘costly envy’ games are
categorized as ‘behindness averse’ (23% in our sample). In each experimental session, two
subjects, i and j, were randomly selected for payment. Then, one of the four choices made by
participant i was randomly chosen and used to allocate the payoffs of both participants, i and j.
Measurement of risk attitudes. We elicited risk attitudes following Holt and Laury (2002) by
asking subjects to make ten binary lottery choices. One lottery (out of 10) was selected at
random for each subject and used for payment. We follow Holt and Laury (2002) and use the
number of safe choices in the ten binary lottery choices to categorize subjects’ risk attitudes. We
TABLE 3. Social preferences elicitation (Bartling et al. 2009).
Choice Option A
Payoff self, Payoff other
Option B
Payoff self, Payoff other
Social Preference ‘Game’
1 $2,$2 $2,$1 Prosociality
2 $2,$2 $3,$1 Costly Prosociality
3 $2,$2 $2,$4 Envy
4 $2,$2 $3,$5 Costly Envy
10
only report data for the subjects (95 out of 100) who completed the ten binary lottery choices
without switching back and forth between the safer and the riskier options.2
Results
As can be seen in Table 4, the raw data appear to confirm the results of Study 1 by showing that
trust increases along with CRT scores, whereas no clear pattern is observed between CRT scores
and trustworthiness. To understand the magnitude of the effect on trust, note that subjects with
the highest CRT score trust on average almost two and a half times more frequently (90.0%) than
subjects with the lowest CRT score (37.5%).
TABLE 4: Trust and Trustworthiness decisions by CRT scores (extended test)
CRT
[observations]
Trust
Percentage of subjects
sending money
Trustworthiness
Average amount returned (out of 300)*
0 [8] 38 125
1 [9] 56 78
2 [18] 56 114
3 [11] 64 123
4 [15] 53 137
5 [12] 75 100
6 [17] 77 85
7 [10] 90 95
* In the case that the trustor has sent his/her initial endowment.
The positive relation between trust and CRT scores is statistically significant in a probit
regression with trust (i.e., a dummy that takes value 1 if the trustor sends his/her endowment, and
value 0 otherwise) as the dependent variable (Table 5, regression [1]). Controlling for gender
(Female Dummy = 1 if female) does not qualitatively affect the result (regression [2]).
Due to the possible link between trust and risk attitudes, we also controlled for risk
aversion in our regression analysis (regressions [3] and [5]). The positive effect of CRT on trust
continues to hold. We found no significant relation between risk aversion and trust.3
2 The proportion of inconsistent switching was similar to the proportion reported by Holt and Laury (2002) which
varies between 5.5% and 13.2%.
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Finally, as mentioned above, recent research has shown that subjects’ distributional social
preferences are related with their CRT scores (Corgnet et al., 2015a; Cueva et al., in press; Ponti
and Rodríguez-Lara, 2015). In particular, Corgnet et al. (2015a) find that individuals with higher
CRT scores are more likely to make choices consistent with “mild” altruism and less likely to be
driven by either egalitarian or spiteful motives.4 In order to account for distributional preferences
as a potential confound in the relation between trust and CRT, we included dummies for both
‘aheadness’ and ‘behindness’ aversion as controls (regressions [4] and [5]).
We find that the effect of CRT on trust cannot be accounted for by distributional
preferences. The coefficient associated with CRT remains positive and significant after the
inclusion of these controls.5 In addition, those subjects who display a stronger aversion to
advantageous inequality (‘ahead averse’) are more likely to trust, although this effect is
significant only in regression [5] where risk attitudes are controlled.
TABLE 5. Probit regression for TRUST
TRUST [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Intercept -0.24
(0.25)
0.05
(0.33)
0.57
(0.59)
0.03
(0.35)
0.68
(0.60)
CRT 0.17***
(0.06)
0.15**
(0.06)
0.15**
(0.07)
0.14**
(0.07)
0.15**
(0.07)
Female Dummy -0.42
(0.28)
-0.47*
(0.29)
-0.40
(0.28)
-0.48
(0.29)
Risk Aversion -0.08
(0.08)
-0.11
(0.08)
Ahead Averse Dummy 0.51
(0.32)
0.69**
(0.34)
Behind Averse Dummy -0.37
(0.33)
-0.26
(0.36)
No. of observations
pseudo R²
Wald-χ²
n = 100
0.06
7.39***
n = 100
0.07
11.01***
n = 95
0.09
11.93***
n = 100
0.11
13.29***
n = 95
0.13
14.58***
Estimation output using robust standard errors (in parentheses).
*p-value<.10, **p-value<.05, and ***p-value<.01
3 We do not find a significant relation between CRT and risk aversion either (Pearson rho = 0.04, p = 0.678;
Spearman rho = -0.002, p = 0.987).
4 We find similar results in our sample. These results are available upon request.
5 The results are robust to different specifications of our measures of distributional preferences. For example, the
CRT coefficient is 0.125 (p=0.063) when we include four dummy variables, one for each decision in the social
preferences task. Also, the CRT coefficient remains significant if we control for each dummy variable separately (all
p’s < 0.054).
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In line with Study 1, we find that, unlike trust, trustworthiness is not significantly related
to cognitive reflection. This is true for all our model specifications (see Table 6).6 In addition,
subjects who are more averse to advantageous inequality tend to return more money to the
trustor (regressions [4] and [5]). Finally, more risk averse individuals also exhibit more
trustworthiness (regressions [3] and [5]).
TABLE 6. Linear regression for the amount returned TRUSTWORTHINESS
TRUSTWORTHINESS [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Intercept 118.73***
(14.16)
115.41***
(15.77)
53.56*
(28.43)
105.67***
(17.17)
52.51*
(30.51)
CRT -3.04
(3.43)
-2.73
(3.38)
-3.11
(3.18)
-3.11
(3.41)
-3.27
(3.18)
Female Dummy
-
4.65
(13.75)
5.59
(13.80)
5.64
(13.61)
5.62
(13.59)
Risk Aversion 10.18***
(3.89)
8.96**
(4.04)
Ahead Averse Dummy
- -
43.79***
(13.36)
39.56***
(13.62)
Behind Averse Dummy
- -
-4.85
(17.53)
-7.33
(17.99)
No. of observations
R²
F
n = 100
0.01
0.78
n = 100
0.01
0.40
n = 95
0.07
2.62*
n = 100
0.09
2.95**
n = 95
0.13
3.63***
Estimation output using robust standard errors (in parentheses).
*p-value<.10, **p-value<.05, and ***p-value<.01
Discussion: Why Would More Reflective People Trust More?
We have shown that cognitive ability is positively related to trust in two experiments where
trusting decisions have real monetary consequences, thus supporting previous findings from self-
report surveys (Sturgis et al., 2010; Hooghe et al., 2012; Carl and Billarri, 2014). Furthermore,
our data indicate that the relation between CRT scores and trust is not mediated by subjects’
distributional or risk preferences.
One likely explanation to the current results could be that individuals with higher
cognitive skills are more able to correctly guess the distribution of trustees’ choices and/or to
choose so as to maximize their expected returns given such distribution. Results from Berg et al.
6 The results are also consistent if we estimate ordered multinomial probit instead of linear regressions, reporting a
CRT coefficient of -0.048 (p = 0.379), -0.043 (p = 0.414), -0.049 (p = 0.339), -0.051 (p = 0.350), and -0.055 (p =
0.291) for regressions [1], [2], [3], [4], and [5], respectively.
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(1995) and others would suggest that attaching a reputation to players might even increase the
propensity to trust. It is not hard to imagine that the ability to trust is largely beneficial in a
society where survival and prosperity crucially hinge upon the capacity to engage in exchanges
with counterparts with various degrees of familiarity. All such transactions, as was argued by
Adam Smith (1759), require an important element of trust. Indeed, evolutionary psychologists
have hypothesized that the capacity to attach a reputation to interaction partners (for which
trusting others may be a necessary prerequisite) is a distinctive form of human social intelligence
favored by natural selection (e.g. Yamagishi, 2001 and Cosmides, Barrett and Tooby, 2010). In
our second study, the decision to trust and send 100¢ to the trustee produced a median (average)
return of 150¢ (107.5¢). Trusting led to a significant increase in earnings compared to not
trusting (p = 0.0599 for the Wilcoxon sign-rank test), supporting such a hypothesis. However, in
our first study, trust led to a non-significant decrease in earnings ($5 vs. $4.07; Wilcoxon sign-
rank test, p = 0.652). Therefore, our results are not completely coherent with an explanation
based on the higher ability of high-CRT individuals to maximize their expected returns in the
trust game.
An alternative explanation of our findings relates to betrayal aversion. Trusting others
involves “social risk” because the returns from trusting depend on another person’s decision and
not on chance alone (e.g. Bohnet et al., 2008). There is evidence that betrayal aversion leads
people to take less risk in situations in which the return on investment is determined by other
people’s decisions rather than by chance alone (Bohnet and Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet,
Herrmann and Zeckhauser, 2010; Aimone and Houser, 2012). Since betrayal aversion has an
important emotional basis (Aimone, Houser and Weber, 2014), it might be argued that the
capacity to override prepotent responses intended to avoid the anticipated emotional costs of
being betrayed by another person is ‘measured’ by the CRT (Frederick, 2005). An interesting
avenue for future research is to explore the mechanisms underlying the positive relation between
CRT scores and trust.
14
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Appendix A (Instructions)
A.1. The Charness-Dufwenberg (2006; 2010) Trust Game (Study 1)
Page 1
Welcome
Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how
people make decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask questions as they arise, by raising
your hand. Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment.
Page 2
You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also receive additional money,
depending upon the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, this
additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.
Page 3
You will be participating in a decision task where you will make a certain choice.
During the session, you will be paired with another person located in a different room.
No participant will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.
Page 4
In each pair, one of you will have the role of Person A, and the other will have the role of Person
B. The amount of money you earn depends upon the decision made in your pair.
Page 5
The Diagram
The decision making problem you will see looks similar to the one you see in the diagram.
Payoffs to you and the other person will be displayed in parenthesis in the diagram. There are
two numbers:
Person A will earn what is in blue, and
Person B will earn what is in orange
if that decision is made.
You and the other person will jointly determine a path through the diagram to a set of payoffs,
which will be described next.
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[Diagram shown to Player A]
[The blue arrow flips from one node to the other]
Page 6
The Diagram Continued
A circle in the diagram is a point at which one person makes a decision.  Each circle is color
coded to indicate whether Person A or Person B will be making that decision.  You will always
have two options.  Those options will include some combination of clicking on a set of payoffs
and/or clicking on a circle.
If a person chooses a circle, another person will make the next decision at the next level in the
diagram.
If a set of payoffs is chosen, the round ends with each of you receiving your respective earnings.
Page 7
Example 1
Choose a payoff (by clicking on one of the payoffs in the diagram) and click the Submit button.
Page 7 (after click the Submit button)
Example 1
Choose a payoff (by clicking on one of the payoffs in the diagram) and click the Submit button.
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(done)
Given your choice in this example.
Person A earns $a [$x].
Person B earns $b [$y].
Continue to the next page of instructions.
Page 8
Example 2
Click on the Orange circle and press the Submit button.
[Diagram shown to Player A]
[The blue arrow flips from one node to the other]
Page 8 (after click the Submit button)
Example 2
Click on the Orange circle and press the Submit button. (done)
Person B now makes the next decision.  He or she will choose a set of payoffs.
Continue to the next page of instructions.
Page 9
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Notice that in the example below the payoffs are determined with the roll of a computerized die.
If Person A chooses Don’t (roll a die), then A receives $a and B receives $b.
If Person A chooses Roll then a six sided die is rolled to determine the payoffs.
If the die comes up 1, A receives $y and B receives $d.
If the die comes up 2-6, A receives $w and B receives $d.
Notice that Person B’s payoff is always $d.
Example 3
Click on the Die and press the Submit button.
[Diagram shown to Player A]
[The blue arrow flips from one node to the other]
Page 9 (after click the Submit button)
Notice that in the example below the payoffs are determined with the roll of a computerized die.
If Person A chooses Don’t (roll a die), then A receives $a and B receives $b.
If Person A chooses Roll then a six sided die is rolled to determine the payoffs.
If the die comes up 1, A receives $y and B receives $d.
If the die comes up 2-6, A receives $w and B receives $d.
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Notice that Person B’s payoff is always $d.
Example 3
Click on the Die and press the Submit button. (done)
A computerized die will be rolled to determine the payoffs ($w/$d) or ($y/$d).
Continue to the next page of instructions.
Page 10
The actual decision making problem is now displayed.
Continue to the next page of instructions.
[Diagram shown to Player A]
[The blue arrow flips from one node to the other]
Page 11
The actual decision making problem is now displayed.
In this decision making problem Person A will decide first by choosing In or Out.
If Person A chooses Out, A and B each receive $5.
If Person A chooses In, then following Person A’s choice, Person B will indicate whether he or
she wishes to choose Roll or Don’t (roll).
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If A has chosen In and B chooses Don’t (roll), then B receives $14 and A receives $0.
If A has chosen In and B chooses Roll, B receives $10, and rolls a six sided die to
determine A’s payoff.
If the die comes up 1, A receives $0.
If the die comes up 2-6, A receives $12.
Person A will NOT be able to see Person B’s decisions.
Page 12
The payoff information is summarized in the chart below:
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them.
If you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button. The instructions will
remain on your screen until everyone has clicked the Start button.
We need everyone to click on the Start button before the experiment can begin.
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A.2. The Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) Trust Game (Study 2)
In this part you are going to be paired with another participant. Both of you will make
decisions in the role of two players, S and R. Once all the decisions have been made the
computer will randomly select one of you to be player S and the other person will be player R.
Finally, payoffs will be computed according to the decisions made by each participant in the role
randomly assigned by the computer.
Both players start with an initial endowment of $10. Then, player S has to decide whether
to keep his or her $10 or pass them to player R. If player S decides to pass the $10 to player R,
the $10 will be multiplied by three. In this case, player R will decide how to allocate the $30
between both players. The different options are as shown in the next screen.
$0 for yourself and 300 for player S
$50 for yourself and 250 for player S
$100 for yourself and 200 for player S
$150 for yourself and 150 for player S
$200 for yourself and 100 for player S
$250 for yourself and 50 for player S
$300 for yourself and 0 for player S
Example 1: If player S chooses the option “keep the $10”:
 The participant in the role of player S will receive $10 corresponding to his or her initial
endowment.
 The participant in the role of player R will receive $10 corresponding to his or her initial
endowment.
Example 2: If player S chooses the option “pass the $10” and player R chooses the option “$15
for yourself and $15 for player S”:
 The participant in the role of player S will receive $15.
 The participant in the role of player R will receive $25, that is, $15 corresponding to the
final allocation and $10 corresponding to his or her initial endowment.
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A.3. Risk Aversion elicitation (Study 2)
For each line in the table in the next screen, please state whether you prefer option A or
option B. Notice that there are a total of 10 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly
selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention
to the choice you make in every line. At the end of the experiment, a number between 1 and 10
will be randomly selected by the computer. This number determines which line is going to be
paid.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose in that line: option
A or option B. To determine your earnings, a second number between 1 and 10 will be randomly
selected by the computer. This number is then compared with the numbers in the line and option
selected (see the table in the next screen):
 If you selected option A and the second number shows up in the upper row you earn
$2.00. If the number shows up in the lower row you earn $1.60.
 If you selected option B and the second number shows up in the upper row you earn
$3.85. If the number shows up in the lower row you earn $0.10.
To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each decision row you will have to choose
between Option A and Option B.  You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other
rows, and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.
Line OPTION A OPTION B
1 1/10 of $2.00, 9/10 of $1.60 1/10 of $3.85, 9/10 of $0.10
2 2/10 of $2.00, 8/10 of $1.60 2/10 of $3.85, 8/10 of $0.10
3 3/10 of $2.00, 7/10 of $1.60 3/10 of $3.85, 7/10 of $0.10
4 4/10 of $2.00, 6/10 of $1.60 4/10 of $3.85, 6/10 of $0.10
5 5/10 of $2.00, 5/10 of $1.60 5/10 of $3.85, 5/10 of $0.10
6 6/10 of $2.00, 4/10 of $1.60 6/10 of $3.85, 4/10 of $0.10
7 7/10 of $2.00, 3/10 of $1.60 7/10 of $3.85, 3/10 of $0.10
8 8/10 of $2.00, 2/10 of $1.60 8/10 of $3.85, 2/10 of $0.10
9 9/10 of $2.00, 1/10 of $1.60 9/10 of $3.85, 1/10 of $0.10
10 10/10 of $2.00, 0/10 of $1.60 10/10 of $3.85, 0/10 of $0.10
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A.4. Social preferences elicitation (Study 2)
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision
problems. For each line in the table in the next screen, please state whether you prefer option A
or option B. Notice that there are a total of 4 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly
selected for payment. Each line is equally likely to be chosen, so you should pay equal attention
to the choice you make in every line.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: if you chose
option A in that line, you will receive $2 and the other participant who will be matched with you
will also receive $2. If you chose option B in that line, you and the other participant will receive
earnings as indicated in the table for that specific line. For example, if you chose B in line 2 and
this line is selected for payment, you will receive $3 and the other participant will receive $1.
Similarly, if you chose B in line 3 and this line is selected for payment, you will receive $2 and
the other participant will receive $4. Note that the other participant will never be informed of
your personal identity and you will not be informed of the other participant’s personal identity.
After all of you have made their choices the computer will select two and only two
participants in the room. The decision table of the first participant will determine the payoff of
the two subjects. Then the computer will randomly determine which line of the first subject
decision table is going to be paid.
The remaining participants will not be rewarded for this part of the experiment.
TABLE D2. Social preferences elicitation (Bartling et al. 2009).
Decision Option APayoff self, Payoff other
Option B
Payoff self, Payoff other
1 $2,$2 $2,$1
2 $2,$2 $3,$1
3 $2,$2 $2,$4
4 $2,$2 $3,$5
